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Labor Market Institutions, the Insider/Outsider Divide, and Social 
Inequalities in Employment in Affluent Countries 
 
Abstract 
This article investigates the role of labor market institutions for social inequalities in 
employment. To distinguish institutional impacts for men and women, age groups, and 
educational levels the analysis draws on data from 21 countries using the European Union 
Labour Force Survey and the Current Population Survey 1992-2012. The analysis 
demonstrates that there is significant heterogeneity in the relationship between institutions 
and employment across social groups. In line with the literature on dualization, institutions 
that arguably protect labor market insiders, i.e. employment protection, unionization, and 
unemployment benefits, are frequently associated with greater inequality between typically 
disadvantaged groups and their insider peers. By contrast, institutions that discriminate less 
between insiders and outsiders, i.e. active labor market policies, minimum income benefits, 
and centralized wage bargaining at times boost social equality on the labor market. The 
insider/outsider argument provides a valuable heuristic for assessing heterogeneity in 
institutional impacts, yet in several instances the results deviate from the expectations. 
 
SER Keywords: employment, inequality, labor market institutions 
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Being jobless is a major cause of economic and social deprivation, as employment is a 
source of economic security as well as an integral factor in facilitating social inclusion and 
well-being (Gallie et al., 2003; Jahoda et al., 1975). At the societal level, joblessness 
undermines social cohesion and requires public resources to support jobless individuals. 
These issues become even more salient when joblessness is distributed unequally across 
social groups. Women, labor market entrants, and individuals with low education are at a 
particular risk of experiencing disadvantages on the labor market. For instance, in 2007 27% 
of 15 to 29 year olds who had already left education were without a job in the United States 
compared to 19% among the 30 to 54 year olds. In the same year, Spain had an already high 
jobless rate of above 30% among all working aged, but women were disadvantaged with 
almost 42% joblessness. Sweden, despite being one of the best performing countries with 
only around 16% joblessness, nevertheless carried a jobless rate of 29% among the low-
educated.1 
To explain the large cross-national variation in joblessness, researchers have devoted 
considerable attention to the combined impact of institutions that regulate the labor market, 
such as employment protection legislation (EPL), unionization, and wage bargaining 
centralization, as well as welfare state policies, such as benefits for the jobless and active 
labor market policies (ALMPs). The labor markets in the United States and Europe in the 
1980s and 1990s led many to see institutions as sources of labor market rigidity (Layard et 
al., 2005; Nickell, 1997; Siebert, 1997). According to this view, institutions obstruct the 
efficiency of the labor market by inducing friction into an otherwise well-oiled machine. By 
contrast, at the end of the 1990s, the success of the comparatively regulated Scandinavian 
                                                     
1
 All figures are based on calculations made by the author using the European Union Labour 
Force Survey (EULFS) and the Current Population Survey (CPS). The sample consists of the 
entire working age population (15-64) but excludes those who are both under 30 and still in 
education (see data section below). 
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countries led to a literature highlighting the potential benefits of institutions (e.g. Estevez-
Abe et al., 2001; Iversen, 2005). Scholars argue that the social investment state increases skill 
levels via ALMPs and produces better job matches via generous benefits (Gangl, 2004, 2006; 
Nelson and Stephens, 2012). Altogether, however, the empirical evidence for the hypothesis 
that institutions strongly affect overall employment levels – be it positive or negative – is 
decidedly mixed (Avdagic and Salardi, 2013; Baccaro and Rei, 2007; Baker et al., 2005). 
That does not mean that institutional contexts are inconsequential for labor markets. One 
important thread to follow in disentangling institutional impact is how institutions shape the 
social distribution of jobs. There is broad support for institutions affecting the labor market 
performance of specific social groups (Esping-Andersen and Regini, 2000). Typically, 
studies focus on one particular disadvantaged social group and analyze the effect of a specific 
institutional arrangement on the labor market performance of that group. For instance, strict 
EPL has consistently been associated with high joblessness among labor market entrants (e.g. 
Barbieri, 2009; Breen, 2005; Gebel and Giesecke, 2016).  
This study tends to a need to examine the heterogeneity in institutional impacts across 
social groups (e.g. Brady et al., 2010; DiPrete et al., 2006; DiPrete et al., 2001). Its major aim 
is to investigate whether there is a more general pattern connecting labor market institutions 
and employment inequality. Traditionally, neither the literature portraying institutions as 
labor market rigidities nor the literature emphasizing beneficial institutional effects have paid 
a lot of attention to heterogeneity in the effects of institutions on employment. Instead, this 
study draws on a growing body of literature on the rising dualization between labor market 
insiders and outsiders (Emmenegger et al., 2012; King and Rueda, 2008; Palier and Thelen, 
2010). The main argument is that institutions such as EPL, corporatist wage bargaining, or 
selective welfare benefits disproportionally benefit so-called insiders, i.e. individuals that 
spend their careers consistently at the core of the labor market. This inadvertently 
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marginalizes outsiders, i.e. individuals who are more vulnerable to atypical work and 
unemployment, which increases the inequality in chances to enter secure employment 
(Biegert, 2014; Fervers and Schwander, 2015). The insider/outsider divide determines the 
degree of social inequality in employment because women, labor market entrants, and the 
low educated are considered typical outsiders. To combat the growing divide between 
insiders and outsiders, the dualization literature recommends social investment strategies, 
which entail ALMPs and generous universal benefits such as minimum income benefits.  
The article’s main contribution to the literature is to test these considerations 
empirically by analyzing social heterogeneity in the impacts of labor market regulation and 
welfare state policies. In addition, it advances the literature analytically and adds to recent 
research that approaches the questions of institutions, insiders and outsiders, and the 
employment of disadvantaged social groups with more analytical rigor (Biegert, 2014; 
Fervers and Schwander, 2015; Giesselmann, 2014; Schwander and Häusermann, 2013). I use 
individual level data from 20 European countries in the European Union Labour Force 
Survey (EULFS) and data on the United States from the Current Population Survey (CPS) 
(Flood et al., 2015) for the time period 1992 to 2012 and combine them with country-level 
time series indicators for institutional arrangements. In contrast to many existing studies on 
institutions and employment, the data enables me to leave the macro-level, model the 
proposed macro-micro relationships, and assess heterogeneity in institutional impacts 
(Adriaenssens and Hendrickx, 2015). I use the longitudinal macro-micro data structure in 
two-way fixed effects models with fixed effects on the level of country-specific social 
groups. This enables me to account for omitted variable bias stemming from time-constant 
unobserved heterogeneity on the meso-level of social groups, which is frequently an issue in 
cross-sectional multilevel models. 
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Theoretical Background 
The study investigates whether there is a general pattern connecting the institutional 
context of labor markets and the distribution of employment across social groups. This 
section will discuss in a first step the arguments of the literature on labor market insiders and 
outsiders. I will then relate the concepts of insiders and outsiders to socio-demographic 
groups, pointing to the typical outsider position of women, labor market entrants, and low 
educated individuals. Finally, I will discuss how institutions shape the insider/outsider divide. 
This will include institutional arrangements at the base of dualization processes, i.e. EPL, 
unionization, wage bargaining centralization, and unemployment benefits. Additionally, I 
will discuss how social investment policies, i.e. ALMPs and minimum income benefits, 
might help decrease the insider/outsider divide.2 
Insiders, Outsiders, and Labor Market Dualization 
With the rising social inequality throughout the industrialized world, there has been a 
renewed interest in the notion of labor market insiders and outsiders. Most prominently, 
scholars describe a process of labor market dualization (Emmenegger et al., 2012; Palier and 
Thelen, 2010; Rueda, 2005, 2014). Their arguments take up and extend insights from 
segmented labor market theory and especially insider/outsider theory (Doeringer and Piore, 
1971; Lindbeck and Snower, 1988). The insider/outsider theory explains economic inequality 
and unemployment based on the assumption that insiders are in a powerful bargaining 
position because the replacement of workers implies transaction costs for employers. Insiders 
                                                     
2
 The study does not include institutional arrangements that are specifically related to the 
labor market performance of single social groups. Most visible examples for such 
relationships perhaps are family policies and childcare provision regarding the employment 
of women (Gornick et al., 1997) and the role of the educational system for transitions into 
employment of labor market entrants and those with lower education (Shavit and Müller, 
1998). The empirical analysis accounts for these potential confounders, but the focus of the 
article is whether inequality is contingent on the base setup of the labor market. 
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can use the resulting asymmetry to raise their wages. Existing unemployment therefore does 
not push wages downward and outsiders remain without a job (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988). 
The dualization literature argues that insiders use this bargaining position to influence 
politics and to entrench their positions. They may do so in a variety of ways, for instance 
through cross-class coalitions with employers, union representation, or social democratic 
parties (Davidsson and Emmenegger, 2013; Rueda, 2005, 2014). One prime example for 
insider driven dualization processes is the deregulation of EPL at the margins of the labor 
market while jobs at the core of the labor market remain as protected as ever, for instance in 
countries such as Germany or France (Eichhorst and Marx, 2011; Marx, 2012; Palier and 
Thelen, 2010). The entrenchment of insiders is detrimental to labor market inclusion because 
it increases the inequality in terms of economic gains and security and at the same time raises 
the barrier to entering insider positions (Biegert, 2014; Fervers and Schwander, 2015). The 
insider/outsider divide thus increases inequality and stabilizes it, which in conjunction with 
political influence of insiders might result in institutional feedback loops. 
Insiders, Outsiders, and Socio-demographic Groups 
The insider/outsider divide is highly relevant for questions of social inequality 
because social groups differ in their likelihood to be insiders or outsiders. There are various 
definitions of insiders and outsiders in the literature. Early iterations of insider/outsider 
theory use a snapshot perspective of the labor market to define who is an insider and who is 
an outsider. Individuals in employment are considered insiders and individuals without 
employment are considered outsiders (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988). Expanding beyond the 
snapshot definition, several contributions to the dualization literature take a life-course 
perspective (Schwander and Häusermann, 2013). Outsiders are understood as individuals 
who over their career are more likely to find themselves without employment and in 
precarious work situations. Following the logic of insider/outsider theory, the present labor 
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market position of individuals is central to subsequent trajectories.3 Because some social 
groups are more likely to find themselves in outsider positions at certain stages in their lives, 
they are more likely to suffer the disadvantages suggested by the insider/outsider logic. 
Although this study focuses on the distribution of employment at a given point, it is sensible 
to follow the life-course approach and to understand cross-sections as the outcome of 
longitudinal labor market processes that differ across social groups. 
An argument can be made that some of the consequential divides in the labor market 
are along the lines of sex, age, and education. Accordingly, the dualization literature 
identifies women, labor market entrants, and the low-educated as typical outsiders (Biegert, 
2014; Emmenegger et al., 2012; Fervers and Schwander, 2015; Schwander and Häusermann, 
2013)4. Most important to the insider/outsider argument is that these groups find themselves 
more frequently in outsider positions from where they face a barrier to the inside. Women 
experience more labor market transitions because of motherhood, other care responsibilities, 
and – at least in older cohorts - lower attachment to the labor market (e.g. Buchholz et al., 
2009; Drbonič et al., 1999). Labor market entrants start from an outsider position. In 
competing with prime-aged and older workers their little work experience adds another 
disadvantage (e.g. Breen, 2005; Gebel and Giesecke, 2016). Individuals with low education 
typically work in low wage sectors and positions with insecure prospects. These segments 
show career paths that are often disrupted by joblessness (e.g. Abrassart, 2015). Altogether, 
                                                     
3
 Current positions could even be considered to rival productivity in terms of importance for 
future career trajectories. For instance, older workers, which are often regarded to be less 
productive due to deprecating human capital, are not seen as typical outsiders, simply 
because they usually are in an established position. 
4
 This does not save individuals in other groups from potential outsider status. For instance, 
there is an increasing number of high-skilled individuals with high levels of labor market 
vulnerability (Häusermann et al., 2015). Still, within these broad categories, women, labor 
market entrants, and the low-educated should bear the highest risks. 
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women, labor market entrants, and the low educated should be most disadvantaged by a 
strong insider/outsider divide. 
Labor Market Institutions and the Insider/Outsider Divide 
The bargaining position of insiders is advantageous in every economy. However, the 
literature discusses several institutional arrangements that raise insider bargaining power, 
secure their positions, and thus might worsen labor market inequality (Lindbeck and Snower, 
1989). More specifically, the insider/outsider divide could be entrenched by labor market 
regulation (EPL, unionization, and wage bargaining centralization) and welfare state 
provisions (unemployment benefits) (Emmenegger et al., 2012; Esping-Andersen and Regini, 
2000; Palier and Thelen, 2010; Thelen, 2014).  
EPL affects the flow in and out of the labor market by determining the difficulty of 
hiring and firing employees. Strict EPL thus stabilizes the positions of insiders (Barbieri, 
2009; Breen, 2005; Gebel and Giesecke, 2016). Without additional job growth, outsiders will 
face lower chances of employment. Furthermore, when strict EPL impedes shedding labor in 
economic downturns, employers might generally hesitate to offer insider positions to 
outsiders. They might prefer employing them on temporary contracts which might lead back 
into joblessness (Barbieri and Cutuli, 2016; Bentolila et al., 2012).  
Corporatist wage bargaining might lead to improved outcomes for insiders and a 
larger insider/outsider divide through two channels. First, a large membership gives unions 
more bargaining power, which results in better working conditions and higher wages 
(Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Rueda and Pontusson, 2000). But, because their membership 
mostly consists of employed people unions are often portrayed as representing insider 
interests (Bertola et al., 2007; Davidsson and Emmenegger, 2013; Lindbeck and Snower, 
1989). In addition, higher wages and secure positions for the employed might leave 
employers more selective in the hiring process. If so, strong unions will be associated with a 
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larger insider/outsider divide. Second, wage bargaining systems differ in the degree to which 
the bargaining process is centralized. Centralization encompasses the level at which 
bargaining takes place and the degree to which unions are able to coordinate their goals 
(Calmfors and Driffill, 1988; Iversen, 1999). Centralized bargaining might help unions reach 
better outcomes for their members, which, again, could come at the detriment of outsiders 
(Palier and Thelen, 2010; Rueda, 2005). 
In addition to labor market regulation, the welfare state might entrench the 
insider/outsider divide, specifically through generous unemployment insurance (Häusermann 
and Schwander, 2012; Seeleib-Kaiser et al., 2012). Eligibility for unemployment insurance 
usually has to be earned with social security contributions. Insiders are more likely to be 
eligible for unemployment benefits due to their consistent labor market participation. They 
can use the added economic security in bargaining and increase their wages, which widens 
the insider/outsider divide. Furthermore, in case of job-loss generous unemployment 
insurance provides a comfortable position to wait for good job matches, leading back to 
insider positions (Gangl, 2004, 2006). According to this view, we would expect better 
employment outcomes for those eligible for unemployment benefits. This is in stark contrast 
to orthodox economics. In the orthodox view generous unemployment benefits should 
disincentivize insiders against working, resulting in a more narrow employment gap between 
insiders and outsiders (Layard et al., 2005; Siebert, 1997). 
So far, the main thrust of the argument is that institutions that raise the bargaining 
power of the core workforce increase the insider/outsider divide. This increases inequality in 
employment between outsiders such as women, labor market entrants, and the low educated 
and their insider counterparts. Deregulation and welfare state retrenchment seem to be the 
implied panacea - surprisingly close to orthodox economics and earlier formulations of the 
insider/outsider theory (e.g. Layard et al., 2005; Lindbeck and Snower, 1989; Siebert, 1997). 
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However, the dualization literature does not consider institutions problematic in principle, but 
only to the extent that they create structural inequality. There might be ways to regulate the 
labor market and provide economic security that do not entrench insider positions and even 
decrease the insider/outsider divide. Most importantly, corporatist wage bargaining might 
create a more inclusive labor market (Thelen, 2014). The comparative labor market literature 
has often endorsed the notion that centralized wage bargaining leads to wage moderation 
(Western, 1998; Kenworthy, 2002; Ebbinghaus and Kittel, 2005). Unions are willing to 
constrain their demands in a centralized system. Because they cannot externalize detrimental 
effects of high wages on the economy, they opt for employment friendly wage agreements, 
which raise outsiders’ chances to find a job (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988; Western, 1998). 
Within the dualization literature these arguments have been used to explain the relatively 
narrow insider/outsider divide in Scandinavian countries (Häusermann and Schwander, 2012; 
Schwander and Häusermann, 2013; Thelen, 2014). Additionally, recent research argues that 
strong unions might follow an inclusive approach and represent outsiders under certain 
circumstances (Benassi and Vlandas, 2016). If so, they might mediate the insider/outsider 
divide instead of widening it (Fervers and Schwander, 2015). 
Furthermore, scholars recommend social investment policies to contain dualization 
rather than deregulation (Emmenegger et al., 2012; Morel et al., 2012). Social investment 
policies promote the employability of jobseekers. They usually take the form of ALMPs and 
generous benefits that allow the accumulation of human capital and improve job search 
outcomes. As argued above, generous unemployment benefits might increase the 
insider/outsider divide because they are available to only a restricted part of the population 
(Seeleib-Kaiser et al., 2012). However, the welfare state can provide benefits to the jobless 
without directly affecting the relative bargaining positions of insider and outsiders. Most 
importantly, minimum income benefits are usually provided independent of previous 
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contributions and thus in principal available to anyone. Like unemployment benefits, 
however, generous minimum income benefits should relieve the pressure to take bad jobs and 
enable participation in training programs (Gangl, 2004, 2006). Hence, they might lead to 
better outcomes for jobseekers independent from their employment history. By contrast, 
orthodox economics would expect negative employment effects for outsiders because 
disincentives should affect those with lower wage expectations the most (Layard et al., 2005; 
Siebert, 1997). ALMPs ease transitions and boost the employability of jobless individuals by 
increasing their human capital, assisting the search process, and subsidizing labor costs 
(Bonoli, 2010). These policies are frequently tailored to help women, labor market entrants, 
and the low educated into the labor market (Armingeon and Bonoli, 2006). If effective, 
spending on ALMPs should reduce employment inequality between typical insiders and 
outsiders. 
Data & Variables 
The study uses cross-sectional individual level data from the EULFS and the CPS. 
Pooling national labor force surveys of all EU members and further European countries since 
1983 the EULFS stands out as the only data source that offers rich information on individuals 
and their working life from a large number of European countries and for a long period of 
time. The IPUMS-CPS provides comparable data from the CPS starting from 1962 (Flood et 
al., 2015). Because I use only very basic socio-demographic information, the US data is a 
comparable to the European dataset (for other work combing the two datasets see Hipp and 
Leuze, 2015)5. Using data from 1992 to 2012 from 20 European countries and the US, the 
international comparison offers widespread institutional variation in addition to variation over 
                                                     
5 To assess whether the inclusion of the US data biases the results I ran robustness checks 
excluding the US. The robustness checks did not reveal substantively different results (see 
Table OS2 and Figures OS5 to OS7 in the Online Supplement). 
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the observed period.6 Due to missing information in some cases, the dataset spans a total of 
351 country-years.7 The analysis includes all individuals of working age (15-64) except those 
below 30 who are still in education. Due to country size and different modes of data delivery, 
the sample sizes in the original dataset differ widely. For instance, the data for Denmark in 
2004 encompass 8,900 observations whereas the German sample in 1997 consists of 290,000 
observations. To give equal weight to every observed institutional constellation I draw 
random samples of 8,500 individuals from each country-year. This also reduces the sample to 
a manageable size for computing. The balanced dataset includes 2,983,500 individuals. 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is EMPLOYMENT (coded employed (1) and jobless (0)). Both 
the EULFS and the CPS follow the ILO definition, meaning everyone who worked at least 
one hour in the week before the interview is considered employed. Analyzing employment 
means including the entire working age population, i.e. the employed, the unemployed, and 
the inactive. Inactivity is defined as not having a job and – in contrast to unemployment – not 
having actively searched for one in the past four weeks. There are several reasons for 
analyzing employment and including the inactive instead of analyzing the more frequently 
used unemployment, especially when the goal is to assess the social inclusiveness of labor 
                                                     
6
 There are six Eastern European countries in the sample. They might differ systematically 
from the Western countries. Table OS3 and Figures OS8 to OS10 in the Online Supplement 
show robustness checks run without the Eastern European countries. They show slight 
differences but generally confirm the patterns found in the main models. 
7
 Availability of micro-level and macro-level data determined the choice of countries and 
periods covered. The countries are Austria (AT, 1995-2012), Belgium (BE, 1992-2012), 
Switzerland (CH, 1996-2012), Czech Republic (CZ, 1998-2012), Germany (DE, 1992-2012), 
Denmark (DK. 1992-2012), Estonia (EE, 2005-2012), Spain (ES, 1992-2012), Finland (FI, 
1995-2012), France (FR, 1993-2012), Hungary (HU, 2000-2012), Ireland (IE, 1992-1997, 
1999-2009), Netherlands (NL, 1996-2012), Norway (NO, 1996-2012), Poland (PL, 2001-
2011), Portugal (PT, 1997-2012), Sweden (SE, 1995-2012), Slovenia (SI, 2005-2012), 
Slovakia (1999-2012), United Kingdom (UK, 1992-1997, 1999-2012), and the United States 
(US, 1992-2012). 
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markets. First, research has shown that omitting the inactive population means missing a 
significant proportion of transitions and dynamics on and off the labor market (Murphy and 
Topel, 1997). Second, there is evidence that some institutional changes have a bigger impact 
on inactivity than on unemployment (Amable et al., 2010). Finally, as the focus of the 
analysis is the impact of institutional arrangements on the employment of typical outsider 
groups compared to insiders, there might be selection bias when focusing on the labor force. 
Typical outsiders are more prone to spending periods out the labor force (e.g. due to 
household responsibilities or education). By contrast, the labor force is a socially selective 
group generally closely attached to the labor market. As this selection process might be 
related to the institutional setting of the labor market, the institutional impact on social 
differences in employment might be underestimated when focusing on unemployment.8  
Independent Variables 
The analysis focuses on social differences on three dimensions: sex, age, and 
education. SEX is a dummy variable, coded (0) for men and (1) for women. Three dummy 
variables distinguish AGE GROUPS of labor market entrants (15-29), the prime-aged (30-54) 
and older individuals (55-64). EDUCATION follows the 1997 version of the International 
Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) distinguishing three different levels: ISCED0-
2 includes lower secondary education or less, ISCED3-4 upper secondary and post-secondary 
                                                     
8
 Because the focus of this article is on the inclusiveness of the labor market it analyzes the 
whole working age population. Yet, there are individuals among the inactive who are not 
available for work regardless of the institutional setting. Therefore, I also run sensitivity 
analysis using a sample that excludes the inactive (see Appendix). Results differ in several 
instances from the models on the whole working population. Frequently, differences between 
social groups are smaller or insignificant, which indicates that the omission of the inactive 
leads to an underestimation of the impact of institutions on social inequality. Yet, there are 
instances in which the differences are even larger. These findings warrant further 
investigation. 
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education, and ISCED5-6 tertiary education. I introduce them as dummy variables labeled 
low education, medium education, and high education.9  
Several other individual level variables could confound the relationships of interest, 
such as household background, occupation, or class. Information on household composition 
has many gaps and is not available for some countries. Therefore, I use three categories of 
MARITAL STATUS (single, married, and widowed/divorced/separated) as a proxy to adjust 
for household background. Information on occupation and other work-related variables is 
only available for those currently holding a job, which is why they cannot be included. 
Characteristics such as occupation and class are usually considered rather stable so the fixed 
effects should absorb them at least partly (see Methods). Nevertheless, it cannot be excluded 
that omitted time-varying variables bias the estimates.  
I model institutional arrangements with indicators that vary by country and year. The 
OECD’s EPL index quantifies the costs and procedures involved in individual or collective 
dismissal on a range from 0 to 6 (Venn, 2009). UNIONIZATION, also provided by the 
OECD, indicates the organizational power of unions as the percentage of salary and wage 
earners who are union members. To measure wage bargaining CENTRALIZATION I use an 
indicator developed by Iversen (1999) and extended by Visser (2013). The indicator 
measures the degree of coordination and centralization, combining level of bargaining and 
union concentration at the respective levels (range 0 to 1).  
I measure UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT generosity with net replacement rates. They 
represent the percentage of the former income an average production worker receives from 
unemployment insurance after taxes and social security contributions. Van Vliet and 
Caminada (2012) provide an indicator that focuses on the replacement rate in the initial phase 
                                                     
9
 Migration background is another interesting individual level variable, especially because 
migrants are often considered typical outsiders, too. However, information on migration 
background shows many missings in the dataset, which prohibits the analysis of this variable. 
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of unemployment, averaging net replacement rates for singles and one-earner families with 
two children. Nelson (2010) collects absolute amounts of MINIMUM INCOME BENEFITS. 
The main component is social assistance payments. Housing supplements, child support, and 
other benefits are added as long as they are not deducted from social assistance. I us the 
absolute numbers to construct a ratio that compares payments to the average wage in the 
respective year and country. The extent to which a country invests in ALMPs is measured by 
expenditures relative to the GDP (Source: OECD). To approximate the amounts spent on 
unemployed individuals, I divide figures for spending on ALMPs by the unemployment rate. 
Table 1 provides an overview of the institutional indicators’ mean and standard deviation by 
country. The total standard deviation is used to calculate standardized coefficients. 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
Based on previous findings, the analysis includes a number of macro-level control 
variables. Labor taxes (income tax and social security contributions) elevate labor costs and 
lower net earnings by driving a wedge between what employers pay and what employees 
receive. The OECD calculates the LABOR TAX WEDGE for a single-earner couple with two 
children and an average income. CHILDCARE policies affect labor market opportunities of 
women in particular. The amount to which a state provides public childcare opportunities is 
measured by the total public expenditure on childcare as a percentage of the GDP (Source: 
OECD). An important dimension of the wage bargaining process is how many workers its 
outcome actually covers. I use Visser’s (2013) adjusted COVERAGE indicator to model the 
percentage of workers covered by wage bargaining agreements.10 Additionally, the dataset 
contains the OECD’s OUTPUT GAP. It measures the distance between the predicted GDP 
                                                     
10
 There are gaps in the time series for coverage. In order not to lose observations, I 
interpolate the data. Dropping coverage from the analysis does not substantively change the 
results. 
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trend based on previous years and the actual outcome and thus indicates a de-trended change 
in a country's economic performance. 
Methods 
The focus of the analysis is the heterogeneity in institutional impacts on the 
employment of social groups. Research on institutional impacts frequently pools time series 
of country-level institutional indicators and correlates them with the aggregate (un-
)employment rate (e.g. Layard et al., 2005; Siebert, 1997). The time series allow for the use 
of country fixed effects, which accounts for time-constant unobserved heterogeneity (Allison, 
2009). Pooled time series models are usually estimated at the macro-level and cannot address 
effect heterogeneity within countries. I use the multilevel data structure provided by the 
EULFS and CPS and the institutional indicators on the country-level for a pooled times series 
approach with two-way fixed effects on the level of country-specific social groups. This 
technique enables the assessment of heterogeneous effects while at the same time keeping the 
advantages of the fixed effects approach. 
Employment is measured as a binary variable. I use linear probability models (see 
Wooldridge, 2002; Angrist and Pischke, 2008) expressed in the following functional form:11 
Y =  + 	
 + 	 + 	
 ∗ 	 + 	 
+	 + 	
 ∗ 	 +  
                                                     
11
 I use linear probability models instead of logistic regression for three reasons: First, in 
contrast to logistic regression, in which coefficients have to be transformed because of non-
linearity, the interpretation of the coefficients from linear probability models is far more 
straightforward. Second, the main goal of the analysis is to compare the impact of institutions 
across different socio-demographic groups. The comparison of coefficients in logistic 
regression models across groups is problematic as the results might be biased by systematic 
differences in the residuals (Allison, 1999). Third, I want to test whether the differences in 
institutional impacts between groups are statistically significant. In logistic regression, neither 
statistical significance level of interaction terms nor their general direction can be taken for 
face value (Ai and Norton, 2003). Figure OS1 in the Online Supplement compares the results 
of the linear probability model to average marginal effects from the logistic regression of the 
baseline model. There are no substantive differences between the two specifications. 
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where the left hand side of the equation expresses the linear probability that individual 
i in country j and year t is employed. On the right hand side, 	is the intercept. 		
 
represents the individual level characteristics (sex, age group, educational level, as well as 
marital status). 	 	signifies the country dummies. The repeated cross-sectional data of the 
EULFS and CPS allow me to introduce fixed effects on the aggregate level of social groups. 
Specifically, I compose groups according to their resident country, sex, age, and educational 
level. Imagine, for instance, a group consisting of all French women between 30 and 54 with 
high education. Introducing dummy variables for each of these groups fixes their mean value 
and thus eliminates all group-specific time-constant heterogeneity (Allison, 2009). The 378 
dummies (21 countries * 2 sexes * 3 age groups * 3 education levels) are represented by 
	
 ∗ 	. The models adjust for all (relatively) time-constant factors on the level of these 
sex-, education-, and age groups within countries, among them such factors as occupational 
composition or class as well as country-level confounders such as educational systems. Wave 
dummies 	 adjust for period effects such as world economic downturns. Thus, these are 
two-way fixed effects models with fixed effects for the country-specific sex, age, and 
education groups.  
The macro-level indicators are included via 	 (EPL, unionization, wage 
bargaining centralization, unemployment benefits, minimum income benefits, ALMPs as well 
as labor taxes, childcare expenditure, bargaining coverage, and the economic output gap) 12. 
To account for the argument that institutional change needs time to show effects and to deal 
                                                     
12 To assess whether the results might be biased by multicollinearity I used post-estimation 
tools on the baseline macro-level model (using the aggregated employment rate as dependent 
variable) to calculate the variance inflation factor (VIF). Multicollinearity should not be an 
issue as there is no VIF higher than 5. 
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with potential reverse causality I introduce all institutional indicators as one year lagged 
variables.13 
The baseline model includes all the aforementioned covariates. The central focus of 
the subsequent models is the interaction between the institutional variables and the socio-
demographic groups. This interaction is expressed by 	
 ∗ 	 where  specifies the 
institution and  the socio-demographic characteristic - sex, age, or education. I run three 
models including all interactions between institutions and the respective individual level 
variable of interest.  
Finally,  is the idiosyncratic error term. Models cluster data in country-years to 
calculate robust standard errors that are corrected for within-group correlation, which also 
addresses the inherent heteroscedasticity issue in linear probability models (Angrist and 
Pischke, 2008).14 Because countries are observed multiple times, there might be serial 
correlation. To deal with this, pooled time series models often include a lagged dependent 
variable. The data at hand does not offer this possibility because there is no panel information 
for the dependent variable. The models include the lagged aggregated employment rate to 
approximate this approach. This way I also avoid bias that can arise from combining fixed 
effects with the actual lagged dependent variable (Nickell, 1981). 
Results 
I present the results in two steps. First, I report results from the baseline model that 
estimates the associations of institutions with overall employment. Second, sections on men 
                                                     
13
 A robustness check using contemporaneous variables did not yield substantively different 
results; see Table OS1 and Figures OS2 to OS4 in the Online Supplement. 
14 Country-years are nested in countries. Individuals in one country but different years are 
likely to be more similar to each other than individuals in different countries. Using clustered 
standard errors for countries, however, is problematic because the number of cases (21) does 
not fulfill the asymptotical requirements for the calculation of robust standard errors (Kezdi, 
2004). The fixed effect approach ensures that at least the time constant part of the issue of 
non-independent observations beyond the level of country-years is taken care of. 
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and women, age groups, and educational levels present the findings from the models that 
interact institutions with the socio-demographic groups. 
Institutions and Overall Employment 
Model 1 in Table 2 displays the baseline model for institutional impact on the total 
working age population. Due to the fixed effects approach the coefficients represent 
differences in individual employment probability within groups associated with changes in 
the institutional arrangements. The institutional indicators are standardized, thus a marginal 
change means increasing the variable by one standard deviation (see Table 1 for standard 
deviations). According to the model, a standard deviation increase in centralization is 
associated with a 1.9% decrease in employment. The coefficient of unionization (-2.1% per 
standard deviation) is significant on the 10%-level. Yet, most coefficients are not statistically 
significant. Thus, the models are in line with previous research that contests the impact of 
institutions on overall employment (Avdagic and Salardi, 2013; Baccaro and Rei, 2007; 
Baker et al., 2005). There is weak evidence at best for a homogeneous institutional impact on 
overall employment as proposed by the literature portraying institutions as labor market 
rigidities and the literature emphasizing beneficial institutional effects. However, as we will 
see in the following sections, non-significant effects on the aggregate level do not preclude 
institutional impacts on social inequality in employment.  
<Insert Table 2 here> 
Institutions and Employment Differences between Men and Women 
Because the number of interaction terms in the models prohibits straightforward 
interpretation of the coefficients, I present the results for heterogeneous institutional impacts 
in graphical form. Figures 1 to 3 display the predicted coefficients and confidence intervals of 
EPL, unionization, wage bargaining centralization, unemployment benefits, minimum income 
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benefits, and ALMP for men and women (Figure 1), 15-29, 30-54, and 55-64 year olds 
(Figure 2), and low-, medium-, and high-educated individuals (Figure 3). Each figure, thus, 
summarizes the findings from one model (Table 2 shows the main coefficients and 
interaction terms from these three models). The group estimates are significantly different 
from each other if the confidence intervals of one group do not overlap with the point 
estimate of the group of comparison (Elwert and Christakis, 2006; see also the levels of 
statistical significance for the interaction terms in Table 2). The figures depict 95% 
confidence intervals. In Table 2 and the text I also point out coefficients significant on the 
10%-level. 
Figure 1 reveals that several institutional arrangements have a significantly different 
association with the employment of men and women. The association of EPL with the 
employment of men is positive (significant on the 10%-level). There is a significant negative 
difference between men and women (ref.: men, difference: -.029, p<.01). As a result, the 
association of EPL with the employment of women is negative (-1.2% per standard deviation, 
p<.05). Unionization shows a comparatively strong association, indicating a decrease in 
female employment by 4.8% for every standard deviation increase. There is no significant 
association with male employment as a result of a large significant interaction term 
(difference: -.055, p<.001). There is a significant difference between men and women for 
wage bargaining centralization (difference: .044, p<.01) showing in the opposite direction. In 
this case, the association is not significant for women but there is a significant negative 
association between centralization and the employment of men (-4.2% per standard 
deviation). 
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
Disaggregating the impact of labor market policies, we find differences between men 
and women as well. On the 10%-level unemployment benefits are associated with higher 
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employment of men while there is no correlation with the employment of women (the 
interaction term is negative and significant on the 10%-level). Minimum income benefits are 
negatively associated with the employment of men (1.3% per standard deviation). Yet, 
women’s employment is positively associated with minimum income benefits on the 10%-
level (difference: .020, p<.001). Finally, ALMPs are the only institutional arrangement where 
there is neither an association with the employment of men nor women nor a significant 
difference between them.  
The overall pattern fits the theoretical expectations. EPL, unionization, and 
unemployment benefits arguably protect insiders and show significantly heterogeneous 
associations to the disadvantage of women. The findings for centralization show in the 
opposite direction and deliver evidence for arguments of wage moderation and outsider 
inclusion. Similarly, the results for minimum income benefits can be interpreted as 
confirming considerations about positive job search outcomes for outsiders. In both cases, 
however, greater equality seems to come at the cost of insider employment. 
Institutions and Employment Differences between Age Groups 
Figure 2 displays the results for the comparison of the three age groups. Surprisingly, 
there are no significant overall associations or interaction effects for EPL with any of the 
three age groups.15 Unionization, however, shows a strong negative association with older 
workers. There is a 10.4% decrease in their employment associated with a one standard 
deviation increase in unionization. The difference to the prime-aged is large and statistically 
significant (difference: -.105, p<.001). Both the prime-aged and labor market entrants show 
no significant coefficient for unionization. Prime-aged men show a negative significant 
association with centralized wage bargaining processes (-2.4% per standard deviation). Labor 
                                                     
15
 The sensitivity analysis focusing on the labor force (see Appendix), however, confirms that 
EPL is associated with higher unemployment among labor market entrants, as reported by 
many other studies (e.g. Breen 2005, Gebel and Giesecke 2016). 
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market entrants and older workers show no significant association. The differences between 
the three groups are not significant either. 
<Insert Figure 2 here> 
Unemployment benefits show no significant associations with labor market entrants 
and the prime-aged but a positive significant association with older workers' employment. 
There is a significant positive difference between the prime-aged and older workers (-.014, 
p<.01). 55-64 year olds experience advantages in a context with higher unemployment 
benefits. There is no significant association between minimum income benefits and the three 
age groups. There is a small negative difference between prime-aged men and older workers 
(significant on the 10%-level). Finally, ALMPs are negatively associated with employment of 
the 55-64 year olds on the 10%-level (1.0% per standard deviation) marking a significant 
difference to the prime aged (-.014, p<.01). Still, there is no significant association of ALMPs 
with the prime-aged or labor market entrants. 
In comparison to the results for men and women, the findings for the age groups 
deliver mixed support for the theoretical expectations. Similar to sex differences, 
centralization shows a negative association with the employment of insiders, i.e. the prime-
aged, thus creating higher equality in employment at the population level. Similarly, ALMPs 
are not associated with higher employment of outsiders but with lower employment of typical 
insiders (in this case older workers) if anything. In general, the employment of older workers 
seems most strongly affected by institutional shifts. The standout finding here is the large 
negative association between unionization and older workers' employment, which contradicts 
expectations of the dualization literature. A potential explanation might be that strong unions 
are able to negotiate good conditions for early retirement (Ebbinghaus, 2006). 
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Institutions and Employment Differences by Education 
Figure 3 shows the associations between institutions and the employment of 
individuals with different educational levels. EPL is not associated with the employment of 
the low- and the medium-educated yet shows a significant positive association with the 
employment of the high-educated (1.5% per standard deviation, p<.05). This association is 
also significantly different from the other groups (ref. medium-educated, difference .019, 
p<.001). Unionization shows a negative association with the medium-educated (-4.8% per 
standard deviation). There are large significant differences to the low- and the high-educated 
(.071, p<001 and .056, p<.001, respectively), resulting in a positive association between 
unionization and the low-educated (on the 10%-level) but no significant association with the 
high-educated. Reversely, the low- and the high-educated show significant negative 
associations with wage bargaining centralization (-2.3% per standard deviation, p<.1 and -
2.6%, p<.01, respectively), whereas the medium-educated show no significant association. 
The difference between medium-educated and high-educated is significant (-.014, p<.05).  
<Insert Figure 3 here> 
Neither unemployment benefits nor minimum income benefits show a significant 
association with any of the educational levels. There are also no significant differences 
between them. Finally, ALMPs display a positive coefficient for the low educated (.7% per 
standard deviation, significant on the 10%-level), no significant association with the medium-
educated, and a negative significant association with the employment of the high-educated (-
0.8% per standard deviation, p<.01). The difference of 0.4% between the medium-educated 
and the low-educated is significant on the 10%-level. The difference between the high-
educated and the medium-educated is significant as well (-.011, p<.001). 
The findings for heterogeneous institutional effects on different educational levels 
only partly align with the expectations of the dualization literature - at least when we consider 
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only the low-educated typical outsiders. The positive association between EPL and 
employment of the high-educated as well as the differences found for ALMPs fit the 
theoretical considerations outlined above. Yet, wage bargaining institutions show the 
strongest associations with the employment of individuals with medium education levels 
instead of those with low education. 
Discussion 
This study explored the impact of labor market institutions on the social distribution 
of employment. In light of mixed evidence for institutional effects on overall employment 
levels, I drew on research observing a growing dualization in labor markets to investigate 
whether institutions that are argued to mostly benefit labor market insiders are associated 
with greater social inequality in employment. Reversing the logic of the argument, the study 
also looked at institutions that regulate the labor market without distinguishing between 
groups and that promote the employment of outsiders. The empirical analysis used data from 
20 European countries and the US for 1992 to 2012 in two-way fixed effects models with 
fixed effects on the levels of country-specific socio-demographic groups. Breaking down 
institutional impact for men and women, youth, prime-aged and older workers, and low-, 
medium-, and high-educated individuals provided important insights.  
First, the findings did not suggest strong relationships between institutions and overall 
employment – be it negative and positive. These results tie in with the mixed evidence 
delivered by previous studies on overall institutional impact (Baker et al., 2005; Baccaro and 
Rei, 2007; Avdagic and Salardi, 2013). By contrast, substantive and significant associations 
between institutions and the employment of single social groups indicated that institutions 
affect the social distribution of employment.  
Second, the patterns revealed in the comparison of men and women, age groups, and 
educational levels partly corroborated the expectations of the dualization literature. In several 
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instances, institutions that arguably increase the insider/outsider divide were associated with 
greater social inequality, in particular EPL, unionization, and unemployment benefits. They 
were frequently associated with relatively lower employment among women, labor market 
entrants, and the low-educated. The findings for wage bargaining centralization tend in the 
opposite direction, underlining arguments about wage moderation in centralized systems. 
Minimum income benefits and ALMPs, both institutions that can be understood as social 
investment policies, were at times associated with greater equality as well when seen from a 
baseline of higher employment among men, the prime-aged, and the high educated. However, 
in several instances the evidence for the dualization arguments was only weak or even 
contradictory. The dualization argument worked well for differences between men and 
women, but less so for different age groups. For example, higher unionization was strongly 
associated with lower employment among the 55-64 year olds, possibly due to more generous 
early retirement schemes in such contexts. The findings also raised the question whether only 
the low-educated suffer from strong insider protection as wage bargaining institutions 
showed stronger associations with the employment of the medium-educated. In sum, the 
findings indicate that the insider/outsider argument provides a valuable heuristic when 
assessing the impact of institutions on the employment of typically disadvantaged groups and 
their peers in the core workforce. Yet, the dualization approach cannot fully explain 
heterogeneity in institutional impacts. 
Besides alternative mechanisms, some limitations of this study may also help explain 
inconsistencies in the findings. First, the analysis neglected job quality. In the recent 
dualization literature, job-type is an important determinant of insider/outsider status. 
Individuals in atypical jobs are considered outsiders as well (e.g. Emmenegger et al., 2012; 
Rueda, 2005, 2014). Moreover, this study used rather broad categories of social groups and 
cross-sectional data that precludes looking at insider/outsider status from a life-course 
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perspective (Schwander and Häusermann, 2013). Thus, the data used to test the claims of the 
dualization literature could not fully model some of its arguments. Taking the present study 
as a starting point, further analyses using longitudinal data should explore how processes of 
inequality generation translate into differences in job quality. Existing research indicates that 
a strong insider/outsider divide results in larger proportions of disadvantaged groups in 
atypical employment (Biegert, 2014; Fervers and Schwander, 2015). Finally, the intention of 
the article was to investigate broad patterns connecting institutions and social inequality in 
employment using a straightforward theoretical argument about insiders and outsiders. Such 
broad analysis necessarily comes at the cost of neglecting details. For instance, ALMPs 
encompass several policy measures. Differences in the impact of spending on training, job 
search assistance, and job creation should be investigated more closely in future studies16. 
This as well as several results that did not fit the insider/outsider logic call for a stronger 
connection between research that analyses dualization processes in policy reforms and 
research that investigates the impacts of macro-level conditions on specific micro-level 
processes (e.g. Breen, 2005; Gebel and Giesecke, 2016). 
Bearing these potentially fruitful extensions in mind, the analysis delivers evidence 
that in order to achieve a more socially inclusive labor market, reform efforts need to close 
the insider/outsider divide created by institutions that so far only benefit traditional insider 
groups. This does not necessarily imply deregulation and welfare state retrenchment. There 
are ways to salvage the benefits of classical institutions of coordination while at the same 
time making them accessible to wider parts of the population. For instance, unions 
increasingly represent the interests of outsiders (Benassi and Vlandas, 2016; Fervers and 
Schwander, 2015). Furthermore, in line with social investment arguments, the results show 
                                                     
16
 In robustness checks available upon request I divided public expenditure on ALMPs 
according to different types of measures. The findings indicate that training tends to help 
outsiders – in line with social investment arguments – while direct job creation rather 
worsens inequality. 
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that some institutions do not affect or even decrease inequality by affecting the whole labor 
market without discrimination and by promoting better integration of targeted groups.  
The present study adds a crucial dimension to existing research on the importance of 
the institutional context for the outcomes of micro-level labor market processes (e.g. DiPrete 
et al., 2001; DiPrete et al., 2006; Brady et al., 2010). It shows that even as institutions are not 
strongly related to overall employment, they shape labor market inequality between men and 
women, age groups, and educational levels. As some groups face challenges at the micro-
level already, the institutional context is central in boosting social equality in employment. 
To build a socially inclusive labor market we need to understand social heterogeneity in 
institutional impacts. Instead of focusing on the institutional impact on overall employment, 
consequences for social inclusion and cohesion need to be of central concern. 
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Appendix: Institutions and Employment in the Labor Force 
Reducing the analyzed population to the labor force, i.e. using a dependent variable 
coded (1) for employment and (0) for unemployment and excluding the economically 
inactive from the analysis (N=2,319,325), yields patterns that partly corroborate the findings 
for the total working age population but also show notable differences in several instances. 
Figures A1 to A3 mirror the models displayed in Figures 1 to 3 with the reduced sample 
(Table A1 mirrors Table 2). Figure A1 shows the same differences in institutional impacts on 
the employment of men and women as the analysis for the working age. However, these 
differences are smaller and not significant in some cases. For instance, EPL is associated with 
higher unemployment of women whereas there is no significant association with the 
employment of men. Yet, the difference between men and women is not significant. 
Unionization, centralization, unemployment benefits, and minimum income benefits are 
associated with the unemployment of men and women along the same lines as they are 
associated with joblessness. Here, the differences are significant. Overall, like in the analysis 
of the working age population, the model for men and women supports the theoretical 
considerations on insider/outsider effects of institutions. That the differences tend to be 
smaller indicates that men and women are more similar in the labor force. 
<Insert Figure A1 here> 
The differences between the two samples are larger in the analysis of institutional 
impacts on age groups. In the labor force, we find evidence for a negative association 
between EPL and the employment of labor market entrants. The negative association of 
unionization with employment is not restricted to older workers but is also found for the 
prime-aged. Furthermore, there is a positive association with the employment of labor market 
entrants (significant on the 10%-level). Similarly, centralization is negatively associated with 
the prime-aged (on the 10% significance level) and older workers. Unemployment among 
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labor market entrants is significantly higher when there are more generous benefits. In the 
case of unemployment benefits, this could be interpreted along the lines of insider/outsider 
bargaining power effects. Yet, this does not explain the negative association with minimum 
income benefits. Finally, ALMPs' positive association with the employment of labor market 
entrants is larger in the labor force. 
<Insert Figure A2 here> 
Comparing the findings for educational levels there are again some notable 
differences between the working age population and the labor force. For instance, the 
medium-educated display a negative association with EPL in addition to the negative 
association with unionization. Furthermore, the low-educated show negative associations 
with both benefit schemes. There is also a negative association of unemployment benefits 
with the employment of the medium-educated. The results for unemployment benefits are in 
line with the insider/outsider argument. Yet, like in the case of age groups, finding a negative 
association for the low-educated and minimum income benefits rather points to disincentive 
effects as advocated by orthodox economics. Finally, ALMPs show a strong positive 
association with the low-educated contrasted by a negative association with the high-
educated.  
<Insert Figure A3 here> 
Whereas in the case of sex differences the two samples showed comparable patterns, 
the differences between analyzing the whole working age population and the labor force are 
more complex for age groups and educational levels. These differences warrant further 
investigation. This study is primarily interested in the degree of inclusiveness of labor 
markets. For this purpose, the employment of the whole working age population is the more 
appropriate indicator. 
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Table 1: Institutional Indicators’ Mean by Country and Within-Country Standard 
Deviation (in Parentheses) 
 EPL Unionization 
Wage Barg. 
Centraliz. 
Unempl. 
Benefits 
Minimum 
Income Ben. 
ALMPs N 
AT 2.5 (.19) .34 (.04) .92 (.04) .62 (.02) .43 (.02) .14 (.03) 18 
BE 1.9 (.06) .53 (.02) .46 (.00) .61 (.01) .34 (.01) .10 (.02) 21 
CH 1.6 (.00) .19 (.02) .31 (.04) .78 (.01) .52 (.04) .16 (.03) 17 
CZ 3.2 (.14) .21 (.05) .25 (.01) .51 (.07) .45 (.06) .03 (.01) 15 
DE 2.7 (.03) .24 (.05) .46 (.03) .65 (.01) .53 (.01) .13 (.03) 21 
DK 2.1 (.03) .73 (.03) .48 (.03) .63 (.04) .54 (.04) .30 (.08) 21 
EE 2.4 (.45) .08 (.01) .35 (.01) .52 (.04) .26 (.03) .01 (.00) 8 
ES 2.5 (.42) .16 (.01) .36 (.02) .63 (.03) .21 (.01) .05 (.02) 21 
FI 2.2 (.10) .73 (.04) .40 (.01) .62 (.04) .54 (.04)  .10 (.01) 18 
FR 2.4 (.06) .08 (.00) .21 (.00) .69 (.01) .33 (.01) .11 (.01) 20 
HU 2.0 (.00) .18 (.01) .24 (.01) .48 (.06) .25 (.05) .06 (.02) 13 
IE 1.4 (.07) .40 (.07) .51 (.03) .46 (.03) .39 (.04) .12 (.04) 17 
NL 2.9 (.03) .21 (.02) .57 (.02) .74 (.03) .42 (.01) .31 (.09) 17 
NO 2.3 (.00) .55 (.01) .51 (.01) .69 (.01 .57 (.08) .19 (.02) 17 
PL 2.2 (.00) .16 (.02) .21 (.02) .29 (.04) .29 (.01) .04 (.02) 10 
PT 4.4 (.26) .21 (.02) .34 (.00) .77 (.01) .36 (.02) .09 (.03) 16 
SE 2.7 (.06) .76 (.06) .51 (.01) .69 (.10) .53 (.06) .20 (.06) 18 
SI 2.6 (.02) .28 (.04) .32 (.00) .66 (.00) .38 (.01) .05 (.01) 8 
SK 2.3 (.19) .23 (.06) .50 (.00) .59 (.03) .41 (.10) .02 (.00) 14 
UK 1.2 (.08) .30 (.04) .10 (.01) .33 (.03) .37 (.01) .05 (.02) 20 
US 0.3 (.00) .13 (.01) .16 (.02) .55 (.04) .19 (.02) .03 (.01) 21 
TOTAL 2.2 (.16) .34 (.04) .39 (.02) .60 (.04) .40 (.04) .12 (.04) 351 
Note: For sources and definitions see text. 
  
- 37 -
Table 2: Linear Probability Regression Models of Employment on Labor Market Institutions and their Interactions with Sex, Age 
Group, and Education 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
 B SE B SE B SE B SE 
EPL .002 .006 .017 .009 .006 .005 -.004 .007 
Unionization -.021 .011 .007 .012 .001 .010 -.048*** .011 
Centralization -.019* .008 -.042*** .010 -.024** .008 -.012 .008 
Unemp. Ben. .002 .003 .006 .003 -.002 .003 .001 .003 
Minimum Inc. Ben. -.003 .003 -.013** .004 .001 .003 .001 .003 
ALMP .002 .003 .001 .002 .004 .003 .003 .002 
         
sex (ref. male)         
female   -.355*** .055     
EPL*fem.   -.029** .011     
Unionization*fem.   -.055*** .010     
Centralization*fem.   .044** .013     
Unemp. Ben. *fem.   -.008 .005     
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Minimum Inc. Ben. *fem.   .020*** .005     
ALMP*fem.   .002 .003     
         
age groups (ref. 30-54)         
15-29     .029 .074   
55-64     -.287*** .029   
EPL*15-29     -.016 .013   
EPL*55-64     -.003 .007   
Unionization*15-29     -.003 .019   
Unionization*55-64     -.105*** .013   
Centralization*15-29     .028 .021   
Centralization*55-64     -.001 .015   
Unemp. Ben. *15-29     .006 .007   
Unemp. Ben. *55-64     .014** .005   
Minimum Inc. Ben. *15-29     -.008 .009   
Minimum Inc. Ben. *55-64     -.009t .005   
ALMP*15-29     .002 .005   
ALMP*55-64     -.014** .004   
         
education  (ref. medium)         
low       .426*** .062 
high       .187*** .018 
EPL*low       .007 .008 
EPL* high       .019*** .005 
Unionization* low       .071*** .008 
Unionization* high       .056*** .006 
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Centralization* low       -.011 .010 
Centralization* high       -.014* .006 
Unemp. Ben. * low       .001 .004 
Unemp. Ben. * high       .002 .003 
Minimum Inc. Ben. * low       -.006 .004 
Minimum Inc. Ben. * high       -.003 .003 
ALMP* low       .004 .002 
ALMP*high       -.011*** .002 
Note: N=2,983,500; standardized coefficients, all institutional indicators are lagged by one year, models control for marital status, labor taxes, childcare, bargaining coverage, 
output gap, lagged employment rate, models include country*sex*age group*education dummies and wave dummies, ***<.001, **<.01, *<.05, <.1. 
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Figure 1. Institutions and the Employment of Men and Women 
 
Note: Predicted coefficients and 95% confidence intervals based on Model 2, Table 2. 
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Figure 2. Institutions and the Employment of 15-29, 30-54, and 55-64 Year Olds 
 
Note: Predicted coefficients and 95% confidence intervals based Model 3, Table 2. 
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Figure 3. Institutions and the Employment of the Low-, Medium-, and High-Educated 
 
Note: Predicted coefficients and 95% confidence intervals based on Model 4, Table 2. 
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Table A1: Linear Probability Regression Models of Employment on Labor Market Institutions and their Interactions with Sex, Age 
Group, and Education (sample: labor force) 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
 B SE B SE B SE B SE 
EPL -.007 .006 -.004 .007 .001 .006 -.021** .007 
Unionization -.019** .007 -.013 .008 -.030*** .007 -.027** .008 
Centralization -.009 .006 -.015** .006 -.010 .006 -.009 .006 
Unemp. Ben. -.005* .002 -.002 .002 -.003 .002 -.006** .002 
Minimum Inc. Ben. -.006* .003 -.010** .003 .000 .002 -.004 .003 
ALMP -.001 .002 -.002 .002 -.003 .002 -.001 .002 
         
sex (ref. male)         
female   .011 .039     
EPL*fem.   -.008 .006     
Unionization*fem.   -.013* .006     
Centralization*fem.   .014* .006     
Unemp. Ben. *fem.   -.006* .002     
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Minimum Inc. Ben. *fem.   .009** .003     
ALMP*fem.   .002 .001     
         
age groups (ref. 30-54)         
15-29     -.060 .050   
55-64     -.026 .018   
EPL*15-29     -.027** .010   
EPL*55-64     .004 .006   
Unionization*15-29     .052*** .008   
Unionization*55-64     -.009 .006   
Centralization*15-29     .011 .012   
Centralization*55-64     -.014 .009   
Unemp. Ben. *15-29     -.011* .004   
Unemp. Ben. *55-64     .006 .003   
Minimum Inc. Ben. *15-29     -.030*** .004   
Minimum Inc. Ben. *55-64     -.004 .002   
ALMP*15-29     .016*** .003   
ALMP*55-64     -.005* .002   
         
education  (ref. medium)         
low       .041 .051 
high       .074*** .016 
EPL*low       .027** .009 
EPL* high       .014* .006 
Unionization* low       .042*** .010 
Unionization* high       .017** .005 
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Centralization* low       -.010 .012 
Centralization* high       .010 .006 
Unemp. Ben. * low       -.006 .005 
Unemp. Ben. * high       .005 .003 
Minimum Inc. Ben. * low       -.011* .005 
Minimum Inc. Ben. * high       .008** .003 
ALMP* low       .011*** .002 
ALMP*high       -.011*** .001 
Note: N=2,319,325, standardized coefficients, all institutional indicators are lagged by one year, models control for marital status, labor taxes, childcare, bargaining coverage, 
output gap, lagged employment rate, models include country*sex*age group*education dummies and wave dummies, ***<.001, **<.01, *<.05, <.1. 
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Figure A1. Institutions and the Employment of Men and Women (sample: labor force) 
 
Note: Predicted coefficients and 95% confidence intervals based on Model 2, Table A1. 
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Figure A2. Institutions and the Employment of 15-29, 30-54, and 55-64 Year Olds 
(sample: labor force) 
 
Note: Predicted coefficients and 95% confidence intervals based Model 3, Table A1. 
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Figure A3. Institutions and the Employment of the Low-, Medium-, and High-Educated 
(sample: labor force) 
 
Note: Predicted coefficients and 95% confidence intervals based on Model 4, Table A1. 
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